Indonesia, a Model for the Islamic Civilization in Transition to the 2lst Century

 At a symposium of the Quagdt Foundation, Indonesia's Minister for Research and Technology, Habibie, who is a graduate of the Aachen University, answered the question whether his country could serve as a model for other Muslims using the following parable. Once upon a time there were two Muslims, one named Ahmed, the other Ali. Ahmed was an industrious and productive boy, more interested in prosperity than in the ideologies of religious hotheads. Ali, however, indulged in religions ideas and how to transmit them to others. Ahmed succeeded in his own way in attaining some prosperity and got many disciples, while the religious hothead Ahmed remained poor and suffered. In the orient there is the tradition that women remain publicly in the background while wielding great power at home. That's why Ali's wife became very angry and full of envy and urged her husband to go to Ahmed and ask him about his secret how he became so successful and rich. Ali gave in to his wife's request and Ahmed answered him that a Muslim could exercise more influence on others when demonstrating his economic success rather than through efforts to force one's own ideas onto others. Habibie didn't say it directly, but it's obvious: Ahmed stands for Indonesia and Ali for Iran, The audience understood very well the hidden insinuations of the parable. They knew that Habibie was about to travel to Iran and asked him to introduce this parable to the Iranian Head of State Rafandsjani. So he did and Rafandsjani is said to have nodded his head thoughtfully.

 Apart from Indonesia's economic success -- or maybe because of it -- in this present crisis it seems as if Indonesia is the most appropriate place for dialogue between the Islamic and Western civilization. Instead of a culture af aggressive defense I met there openness and tolerance. Even the chairman of the influential traditional Islamic Nahdatul Ulama Organization, Abdurrahman Wahid, calls for religious tolerance, human rights and protection of the Christian minority", what was confirmed by Franz Magnis-Suseno, a Christian missionary who teaches in Indonesia. In line with religious tolerance the economic success of Indonesia is overwhelming. Indonesia cannot only boast of economic growth rates which are comparable to those of Japan but has transformed from a food importing country to one that exports food. It seems to be the only OPEC -- country that has been able to use its oil revenues for financing a highly productive economy -- at first for import substitution then by means of industrialization to an export-oriented country.

 But Indonesia has more to offer than just economic success. It represents a model for religiously and ethnic-culturally different communities to live together in peace and mutual respect. In Indonesia, too, there exists fundamentalism which can, however, be treated -- in contrast to the Arab Mediterranean region -- as quantity negligible. In general the insignificant group of fundamentalists is usually made up of Indonesians who have studied in the Arab centers of Islamic civilization and who arduously want to imitate the letters rigorous Islamic version.

 The political system in Indonesia guarantees the equal standing of all five main religions in the country. Muslims, however, represent 85 percent of the 193 million inhabitants, living on 6.000 of a total of 16.500 islands. On Java alone live 40 percent of all Indonesians. The other four religions - Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism - are set on equal level to Islam.

 In Jakarta's city center the church tower of Christian cathedrals is not higher than the minaret of the huge Istiqlal mosque, the largest in all of Southeast Asia.  In Istanbul, on the other hand, one notices that the church towers are a lot tower than the minarets of mosques and discreetly hidden in side streets. The secular character of Turkey doesn't make a difference. That's not by chance but a religious rule which finds its historic roots in the definition of a Christian - the same as for a Jew as "dhimmis", a subdued, protected minority, therefore not on equal level with Muslims.

 In Indonesia, non-Muslims are not "dhimmis" but citizens of equal standing. Southeast Asia offers a model, for an equal definition of Islam and Christianity which is expanded also to Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism, religions which are not mentioned in Islamic revelations. The late 20th century is not the world of the 7th century when everything revolved around the then perceived main centers of civilization, the Christian and Muslim empires as well as around the Jewish religious communities.

 Religious harmony exceeds by far the parable of Lessing as demonstrated by Southeast Asia; it has to embrace the other world religions, and Southeast Asia represents here a model for peace. Can a combination of economic success and the practice, of religious and ethnic-cultural tolerance as is the case in Indonesia, serve as a model? Is such a model not only an example for the Islamic civilization but also for peace between civilizations in general?.

 The Islamic revelation of the 7th century (the first century according to Islamic calculation) falls together with the height of Islamic civilization. Because of the fact that the Koran was revealed in Arabic language and Arabia was the place where the revelation took place, the Islamic civilization is until, today -- at least by the Sunnite branch which represents 90 percent of all Muslims -- strongly influenced by Arabic Islam. As a visible sign non-Arab Sunnites (90 percent of all Sunnites) have an Arab or Arabic name. Southeast Asians, too, are Sunnite Muslims. Indonesians belong to the Shafi'i school of law/confession of Sunnism.

 It was not until the 15th century that Islam's expansion reached Southeast Asia. Like West Africa Southeast Asia didn't come under Islamic influence by means of armed Jihad but through trade relations. Islamic traders - Arabs and Hindus of India who had converted to Islam - came to Southeast Asia early in the 15th century and were able to convert local rulers (there didn't exist unitary states like Indonesia or Malaysia at the time).

 The ruler of Malacca, for example, embraced Islam in 1414. Thus the Islamization started first with the conversion of the rulers to Islam. Then these rulers spread their new-found religion to their subjects. Afterwards Javanese traders took Islam to the whole archipelago which is called today Indonesia.

 The local rulers became sultans and as consequence Islam which was introduced from the outside world merged with local cultures into a synthesis. Fred van der Mehden characterized Southeast Asia's Islam as one that "lacks spiritual maturity - a feature which continued up to twentieth century".

 Even today one finds in Indonesia a blend of adat (local customs and traditions often from pre-Islamic times) and Religious Islamic rules. The result is an Indonesian version of Islam that is not seldom quite independent.

 The author calls attention to the quarrel between the former Indonesian Minister for Religious Affairs, Mukti Ali, and the Egyptian scholar al- Azhar in Cairo in November 1979 on the occasion of the "First Conference on Islamic Civilization". Mukti Ali caused a lot of frown among his audience when describing adat as the nucleus of Indonesian Islam. Responding to the provocation that this would not be Islamic and he would have to decide whether he is Muslim or Indonesian, he stated in a sovereign manner: "I am an Indonesian Muslim."

 It is important to point here to the conflict-and-tension-rich de facto schism of Indonesian Islam into abangan and santri. Santri-Islam is in Indonesia orthodox and clings to the letter while abangan Muslims adopt into their religious way of life pre-Islamic, even pre-Hinduistic cultural elements and rituals. Abangan Islam prefers also Islamic mysticism to the Sharia.

 85 percent of the 193 million Indonesians are Muslims but also part of 300 different ethnic cultures. That is why the great cultural variety is a main characteristic of Indonesian Islam. It can, therefore, maintain its position in Southeast Asia in recognition of the great religious and cultural diversity; and because of its adaptation it can serve as a better model for pluralism and tolerance at the same time.

 In the Southeast Asian archipelago live approximately a quarter of a billion Muslims. In the Philippines, Burma, Thailand and Cambodia Muslims represent a minority. But Indonesia and Malaysia are both countries with an Islamic core population or Muslim majority. Both are counted among Asia's economic "tigers" and both, have not much of fundamentalism and, therefore, serve as a model for domestic peace.

 Indonesia is to be regarded as a secular state, Pancasila viewed as a secular as well as an equality definition of monotheism since religion is defined as ethics and sepa-rated from the stale. This is the foundation which made it possible to overcome the tension between Islam and a secular national state in Indonesia and to demonstrate a successful pattern for harmonious unity of cultural-ethnically and religiously differing communities.

 Since the Arab core countries of Islamic civilization have neither such, a cultural-ethnical and religious foundation for inner peace nor - despite their oil-based prosperity - can neither offer an economical successful development model the question comes up whether it is Southeast Asia that will become the center of Islamic civilization while moving into the 21st century because of its model capabilities. In order not to be guided by wishful thinking one has to part from Western reasoning patterns of economic and political rationality.

 In forming a synthesis with nationalism Islam has played a central role during the independence war of the archipelago of 16.500 islands which is called today Indonesia. In 1945, however, the idea prevailed that such a diverse world can only get and maintain peace on a secular basis. When the first Constitution was worded a fierce fight erupted between the supporters of the "Jakarta Charta" and of Pancasila. The first group wanted to preface the Constitution with a preamble which would tie Indonesia to belief in God as an exclusive-islamic belief in Allah as well in recognition of Sharia as the legal basis for Indonesia.

 The adepts of Pancasila, however, wanted to achieve a synthesis of cultural pluralism and secularism. Pancasila are the five principles (panca = five, sila - principle); monotheism, humanism, national unity, democracy and justice). Important is the definition of a tolerant and pluralistic monotheism by the then President Sukarno who described the first principle of Pancasila like this: "It's the principle of belief in God. It means that all Indonesians believe in God in the sense that the Christians believe in God in harmony with the teachings of Jesus Christ, the Muslims in line with the teachings of Mohammed, the Buddhists practice their religion as prescribed in their holy scriptures. But we all together believe in God. The Indonesian state is a state where every believer can worship God according to his own choice of religion. The Indonesian people believe in God in a refined manner that is without the egoism of any one religion."

 This Pancasila definition of Monotheism is a clear-cut deviation from the traditional Islamic Dhimmi principle. Pancasila puts Muslims, Christians, Hindus and Buddhists on an equal level. That's not only a revolution in Islamic thinking but also a translation of the mystical ideas of the great Sufi Muslim Ibn Arabi into a political program. The Sufi Islam's tolerance and its rejection of any dogmatism becomes a basis of political reality in Indonesia.

 In this sense the fight in Indonesia is not one between local traditionalism and secularism introduced from the outside. It's more a conflict between santri, an Islam clinging to the letter, and Abangan Islam, the more flexible Islam which emerged from a synthesis between pre-Islamic cultures and Islam. Abangan is secular but still original, therefore not a fashionable idea of Western-influenced intellectuals. Pancasila is the highest expression of freedom of religion. In contrast to religious indifference in Western civilizations, the Pancasila-based freedom of religion does not mean a rejection of religion but freedom of religious pluralisms. It's an Islamic-Southeast Asian extension of the Lessing formula.

 The decisive point is that this first monotheistic principle of Pancasila came from the Islamic periphery and not from the Islamic center where the definition of Christians and Jews as "dhimmi/protected ones" i.e. second-class believers is still dominant. The original Islam didn't know neither Confucianism nor Buddhism nor Hinduism. Southeast Asia enriches Islam not only by recognizing these world religions but also by putting them on equal standing with Islam.

 It therefore offers not only a model for domestic peace in this part of the world but also a promising basis for an Islamic-Christian dialogue in the Mediterranean region. The Mediterranean Islam can learn a lot from the Southeast Asian Islam. Can the periphery become thereby the center?
 

 Religious Peace Maintains Domestic Peace

 At first the Islamic Masyumi party pursued a peaceful policy for the introduction of Sharia but the Darul Islam group believed to have to put more weight to this demand through terrorism. This terrorism spread through the country from 1948 to 1962 when the movement's leader, Kartosuwirjo, was shot down on June 4 of that year. The years of the Darul Islam terrorism causing great devastation in West Java - were of the most terrifying periods in the history of Indonesia. In the 1970s this violence experienced a revitalization throughout the actions of the "Commando- Jihad" in Indonesia.

 The reaction of the Indonesian Government to this terrorism - which can by no means described as soft-handed - was in line with the Islamic tradition of self-preservation as described by the Koran's principle "Life for life, eye for eye, nose for nose, ear for ear, tooth for tooth ..." (Koran 5145).

 Western observers view this battle against terrorism often as human right violations. Here the difference of civilizations becomes evident. People in the West have to learn that Muslims will not understand when Western democracies tolerate exterritorial [?] areas for ethnic and fundamentalist groups in the name of tolerance or- as happened in Hannover - when the state government (Minister of Interior) officially allowed for "Chaos days" which made the police because of lack of a legal basis - not only to mere onlookers to destruction but with 170 injured officers victims themselves. These and similar examples do not make Western democracy attractive for other civilizations. These have their own ideas and will for self-preservation which has to be respected.

 A Muslim learns already as a child to defend himself and not to turn his other cheek for a second strike. But still one has to note that Indonesia Is not a "law state" (Rechtsstaat) in the European sense. Pancasila, too, is not a democracy of European pattern but it would be the best an Islamic state could ever achieve. And only because of this reason Indonesia is a country that could serve as a model for Islamic civilization. It would be eurocentric to put the European yardstick to the Indonesian model.

 Despite its many shortcomings, Suharto's New Order was able to guarantee domestic peace in an ethnically and religiously divers, very complex country with democratic means. Religious peace is an important cement of domestic peace. Beside a remarkably high standard of living the Indonesian population enjoys freedom though they cannot be compared with those of the West.

 What is important is the fact that the economic development of Indonesia has brought forth a middle class forming - not unlike in the West - the cornerstone of the present order and making possible democratization. Democratization and religious-cultural reforms (for example: Pancasila), which were initiated without the middle class as foundation, remain without social basis.

 There exists in Indonesia a ruling party. the Golongan Karya (nicknamed Golkar - more an association of the political and administrative elite than a political party in the Western sense) and two opposition parties that is the assembly of all former Islamic parties under the collective term Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/PPP (Unitad Development Party) and the assembly of nationalists and Christians in the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party). When all opposition parties were obliged in 1985 to adhere to Pancasila, its was criticized as a lack of democracy. But in view of the above-mentioned five principles it becomes clear that they are indeed compatible with democracy. Is it possible that the - until now - peripheral cultural zone of Islamic civilization can become a model for other Islamic civilizations, even for the Arab center? Can Southeast Asia become an example to follow for the core region of Islamic civilization in the Middle East that is not successful in our time neither in its economic development nor in its spiritual mobilization?

 I know first hand from the Middle East and the Mediterranean region that Mediterranean Muslims know only little or nothing about the economic success of Southeast Asia. And particularly are they ignorant about the Pancasila principles the Islamic Southeast Asian countries have found as a formula for different religions living together on an equal basis. I met in Southeast Asia orientals who teach Southeast Asia orthodox Islam but are not willing to study the experiences made there.

Of Vital Significance to the West

 The number of Indonesians who have studied in Saudi Arabia was much larger: 904. No doubt, these figures have increased dramatically. Some of these students take home the ideas of Muhammad Abduh and Ali Shariati, ideas which in the essence will reconcile Islam with modernism. But as the experiences show the majority of these young people serve as messengers for the export of fundamentalism from the Middle East to Southeast Asia. In Jakarta I found out that many publications of the spiritual father of Islamic fundamentalism, Sayyid Qutb, (particularly "Road sign's" and "The Islam: Problems of a Modern Civilization") are available in Bahasa Indonesia, the Indonesian version of the Malayan language. In Kuala Lumpur, too, these fundamentalist catechisms are available (in Malayan language).

 The above-mentioned Indonesia scholar Fred van Mehden had dedicated a special publication to the cultural interaction between Southeast Asia and the Middle East, entitled "Two Worlds of Islam - The interaction between Southeast Asia and the Middle East". He writes: "Religious ideas originating in the Middle East and brought to Southeast Asia still dominate the exchange between both religions. There is only little influence of Southeast Asian intellectuals on the rest of the Islamic world. ... The religious education in the Middle East, particularly in Cairo, remains the main source for Islamic ideas in Southeast Asia. especially in Indonesia."

 Western thinking is oriented toward successful business. Western observers, too, who are not much interested in Marx, regard economic developments as of higher value as other things. That's not the case in Islam. Apart from its core center in the Middle East, Islamic civilization has given rise to different cultural zones in West and East Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, Central Asia and Southeast Europe. It's not a penchant toward Arabocentrism when stating that all these cultural zones are religiously and culturally very much influenced by the Middle Eastern core region despite the fact that the latter offers neither an economically nor socially successful. example. This statement does not overlook the cultural diversity within the unity of Islamic civilization.

 The question for the transition into the 21st century remains whether the - because of its pluralism - tolerant Southeast Asian Islam in line with continued economic success and stability of its political systems offers - despite the above-mentioned limitations - a model for the Islamic civilization.

 The countries of the Mediterranean Islam do not offer in their present state a model to follow: Their economies are shaky and their countries become unstable because they lack a formula for mutually respectful and peaceful living together of people with different ethnical and religious background.

 The future of the so heterogeneous Islamic civilization is open and the question whether the Mediterranean or Southeast Asian Islam could become a model for the future of Muslims can only be answered by the Muslims themselves who live there. But the direction the Islamic civilization steers is - in the era of globalization - for the West, too, of vital importance.

 (Translated from Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 27, 1995).

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